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Learning to reduce risk in child protection 
Eileen Munro 
British Journal of Social Work  
 
Abstract 
 
This article argues for a systems approach to learning how to improve performance, 
conceptualising child protection services as complex, adaptive systems. This requires 
an acceptance of the complexity of the work, the essential role of professional 
judgment, and the need for feedback loops in the system where lower level workers 
are not afraid to communicate honestly about their experiences, both good and bad, 
and senior managers treat their feedback as a valuable source of learning.   It is argued 
that current strategies to manage risk in child protection are, paradoxically, making it 
harder for professionals to learn how to protect children better.  Three factors are 
identified as combining in such a way that they promote a culture in which 
professional practice is being excessively controlled and proceduralised: the person-
centred approach to investigating child deaths, the blame culture, and the performance 
management system.  The way they reduce the opportunities for learning are 
explored.   
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 Introduction 
Reducing the incidence of child maltreatment is a key policy aim in most countries.  
In developed nations, sophisticated systems of child welfare and child protection have 
been implemented. However, in many countries and states there have been recent high 
profile, critical reviews of performance (e.g. the Royal Commission on child 
protection in New South Wales, Australia (Woods Commission, 2008); the 
independent review of child protection services in British Columbia, Canada (Hughes, 
2006); and the progress report on child protection in England (Laming, 2009).  There 
is public concern that, despite intensive effort and considerable investment, there has 
been insufficient improvement.  Child deaths from maltreatment are the extreme 
evidence of failure and public reaction is harsh when, with hindsight, it looks as if 
they could and should have been prevented by professionals. 
 
This article argues for a systems approach to learning how to improve performance, 
an approach that takes as a fundamental assumption that ‘to make sense of the 
complexity of the world, we need to look at it in terms of wholes and relationships 
rather than splitting it down into its parts and looking at each in isolation’ (Ramage & 
Shipp, 2009 p.1).   Child protection services are conceptualised as complex adaptive 
systems.  The ‘complex’ part of the label refers to the nature of causality within the 
system – to nonlinear dynamics  which limit the predictability of actions so that the 
system should not be seen as a machine where, once the correct causes are put in 
motion, all will proceed in a precise and predictable way.  The ‘adaptive’ part of the 
label follows on from this - a system needs to be able to receive feedback about what 
is happening to self-regulate, i.e. adapt its behaviour in the light of this learning.   
 The systems approach offers a potentially fruitful way of reducing risk to children of 
inaccurate assessments and ineffective interventions through improved organisational 
learning but it requires some radical changes in the way that services currently 
operate.   In outlining how it would operate, the obstacles to such a reform become 
apparent, obstacles that have, ironically, arisen from attempts to improve performance 
interacting in such a way that the cumulative effect is negative.  The responses to 
public criticism combined with the person-centred approach to investigating tragedies 
and managerialism have contributed to creating a very controlled and proceduralised 
workforce that mitigates against learning and adapting in response to new 
information. 
 
The focus in this article is specifically on the English system but the argument will be 
applicable, in varying degrees, to other countries.  The issue of blame has been 
significant in the other countries of the UK, the US, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand.  Mainland European countries, which tend to have a more generous welfare 
approach to supporting families, have seemed to avoid a high level of public 
condemnation of professionals when children die (Hetherington, Cooper, Smith, & 
Wilford, 1997) but recent high profile cases in the Netherlands and Germany raise the 
question whether a more blaming approach may be developing (Kindler, 2008).  All 
of these countries, however, share with England a move to ‘New Public Management’ 
in public sector services and this, it will be argued, is one of the contributory factors 
to the current problems.  
 
Large-scale empirical studies have a major role to play in improving our knowledge 
of how to recognise abuse and which interventions are effective.  However, this 
article is concerned with organisations’ ability to learn about and improve their own 
performance.  
A systems approach to learning  
Viewing organisations involved in providing a child protection service as systems will 
be familiar to many readers since the concept of system has long been used in 
theorising about families.  A system is a collection of parts (or subsystems) that 
interact to accomplish an overall goal. Systems have inputs, processes, outputs and 
outcomes, with ongoing feedback among these various parts. If one part of the system 
is removed, the nature of the system is changed   Complex systems, such as social 
systems, are comprised of numerous subsystems as well. These subsystems are 
arranged in hierarchies, and integrated to accomplish the overall goal of the overall 
system. Each subsystem has its own boundaries of sorts, and includes various inputs, 
processes, outputs and outcomes geared to accomplish an overall goal for the 
subsystem 
 
Complexity refers not to the number of parts but the nature of their causal 
interactions, specifically to non-linear causality where minor differences in initial 
values can lead to radically different outcomes, often referred to as the ‘butterfly 
effect’. In contrast to the classical linear view of the world in which it is assumed that 
small differences  converge to a point and that approximations can give a fairly 
accurate picture of what might happen, ‘when a system is nonlinear and webbed with 
feedback loops, repetition feeds the change back on itself, causing it to amplify and 
grow’ (Wheatley, 2006 p.120).  Therefore, although subsystems are seen as being in 
hierarchies, a systems approach challenges the widespread assumption that top-down 
control is possible and desirable.  Senior management are not able to predict with 
accuracy the precise consequences of the various instructions they issue.  They 
therefore need to ensure that there are good feedback loops so that they gather the 
necessary evidence about how well their instructions are operating.      
 
This raises the question of how we define ‘improvement’ in performance.  In a top-
down control system, improvement is typically seen as greater compliance with 
procedures, rules, etc.  In child protection, there is considerable scope for improving 
practitioners’ compliance with principles of good practice. Child abuse inquiries 
repeatedly identify significant deviations. The inquiry into the care of Victoria 
Climbie concluded that: 
 
Victoria died because those responsible for her care adopted poor practice 
standards.  These were allowed to persist in the absence of effective 
supervision and monitoring (Laming, 2003, para.6.94).   
 
However, in a systems approach there is also recognition of the need to dig deeper to 
understand why practitioners break rules rather than just focus on ensuring 
compliance through more control and monitoring.   Practitioners can break rules for 
good reason.  The range of decision scenarios they confront is so varied that, at times, 
the rules or accepted good practice do not apply. Also, when there are constraints of 
time and resources in the system, workers have to make pragmatic decisions about 
what to prioritise.  Moreover, the behaviour within any one subsystem is influenced 
by the behaviour of the other subsystems with which it interacts. Therefore the work 
environment can make it difficult or undesirable to follow the official procedure.  
Woods and Hollnagel (2006) point out that practitioners are often blamed for causing 
mistakes but their role in creating safety is at least as important.  In child protection 
where inter-agency working is so crucial, senior managers need to recognise that 
those at the front line have more knowledge than they do about how the behaviour of 
their subsystem is interacting with that of other subsystems, e.g. how changes in 
police procedures are affecting social work investigations.   
 
The systems approach, therefore, conceptualises learning within organisations not 
only in terms of compliance with prescribed behaviour but also in terms of reflecting 
on the rules and processes. Argyris and Schon (1978) formulate these two goals in 
terms of single- and double-loop learning. The theory will be familiar to many in 
child protection in terms of individual learning through reflective practice.  However, 
the principles apply also to organisational learning.   
 
Argyris and Schon argue that people have mental maps about how to act in situations, 
guiding the way they plan, act, and review their actions.  These maps are more 
influential than the explicit theories that people adopt but many people are unaware of 
the maps they are using.  They propose two theories of action: ‘theories-in-use’, 
governing actual behaviour and usually tacit, and ‘espoused theory’, how we explain 
our behaviour to others.  Developing congruence between the two will improve 
effectiveness and this requires us to become more aware of our theories-in-use 
through reflection and discussion.    
 
Learning involves the detection and correction of error.   Responses to error can 
involve either single-loop or double-loop learning: 
 
When the error detected and corrected permits the organization to carry on its 
present policies or achieve its present objectives, then that error-and-correction 
process is single-loop learning.  Single-loop learning is like a thermostat that 
learns when it is too hot or too cold and turns the heat on or off.  The 
thermostat can perform this task because it can receive information (the 
temperature of the room) and take corrective action.  Double-loop learning 
occurs when error is detected and corrected in ways that involve the 
modification of an organization’s underlying norms, policies and objectives 
(Argyris & Schon, 1978, p.2). 
 
Applying these ideas to child protection systems, the history of the past four decades 
shows major developments in formulating rules, guidance, and systems of 
accountability for front line workers.  There are excellent reasons for these 
developments: they involve formulating best practice and seeking to ensure it is 
implemented widely.  However, it can be argued that the way that they have been 
realised has tended to encourage single-loop learning – of assuming that they are 
essentially the correct way of operating and seeking new ways of ensuring they are 
enacted.  Double-loop learning which would look more critically at the way 
improvement is being sought has therefore been undervalued. Compliance with 
existing procedures, rules and audit regimes is the key focus of appraisal rather than 
whether those procedures, rules and so on are the best way of protecting children.  
 
This is contributing to professionals’ dissatisfaction with their work. Recruitment and 
retention problems have become severe in many countries.  Research has shown that 
the dominance of managerial control has been a contributing factor (Audit 
Commission, 2002; Gibelman & Schervish, 1996) and ‘the erosion of opportunities 
for professional discretion at the practice front’  (Healy & Meagher, 2004 p.245; 
Laming, 2009)     
 
In England, Lord Laming’s report on the progress of child protection services was 
highly critical of the way practice has developed in recent years, painting a worrying 
picture: 
Professional practice and judgement, as said by many who contributed 
evidence to this report, are being compromised by an over-complicated, 
lengthy and tick-box assessment and recording system. The direct interaction 
and engagement with children and their families, which is at the core of social 
work, is said to be at risk as the needs of a work management tool overtake 
those of evidence-based assessment, sound analysis and professional 
judgement about risk of harm (Laming, 2009 p.46). 
 
New technology, e.g. software to structure case records, has been widely introduced 
in many countries to facilitate good practice but there is a growing body of research 
giving detailed accounts of how it is, in practice, having negative effects and 
disrupting the reasoning processes of professionals (Bell, Shaw, Sinclair, Sloper, & 
Rafferty, 2007; Gillingham, 2009; Peckover & Hall, 2008). 
 
While many will agree that over-control is stifling good quality front-line work, it is 
not easy to change direction and move to a more reflective organisation able to 
support more creative and adaptive performance at the front line.  Child protection 
systems operate within wider social systems and are subject to a number of factors 
that push them towards a defensive, controlling mode, key factors being the response 
to error, the dominance of blame, and the managerial approach which are now 
explored. 
Responding to error 
A child’s death provokes strong reactions and when that death looks as if it could and 
should have been prevented by precisely those people employed to protect children, 
the degree of public anger is intense.  The deaths of Victoria Climbié in England, 
Savanna in the Netherlands, Dean Shillingsworth in New South Wales, are examples 
of the way that individual cases have, in so many countries, been the major trigger for 
evaluating child protection services.   
 
Child death reviews, or Serious Case Reviews in England, are a widespread 
procedural response to deaths or serious injuries of children known to the child 
protection system.  The aims are to understand what happened and to identify any 
lessons for improving practice.  This inevitably involves making judgments about 
whether professionals could have and should have protected the child better.  Any 
such judgment rests on assumptions about causality, about how errors are produced.  
The standard views on causality have tended to push the system towards ascribing 
responsibility mainly to individuals and therefore tended to produce solutions aimed 
at controlling the errant individuals. 
Reason (2009) identifies four basic components in an error: the intention, the action, 
the outcome, and the context.  Errors of intention encompass whether there was an 
intention to act (as opposed to an involuntary action), whether the actions went as 
planned (absent-minded slips and lapses), and whether they achieved their intended 
outcome (was there a flaw in the plan of action) (Reason, 2009 p.29). Analyses of the 
action component raise questions such: was the action based on a good assessment of 
the problem and plan of intervention; was it executed as planned; and was it 
adequately monitored to ensure it was going as planned (Reason, 2009 p.32)?  Much 
of the analysis in child abuse inquiries has focused on these aspects.  For example, 
inadequacies in the assessment of the child’s safety are frequently linked to flaws in 
communication between different professionals in contact with the family (Munro, 
1999; Reder & Duncan, 2003).   
 
Analysing errors according to the third component - outcomes is problematic in child 
protection.  An adverse outcome in child protection may not, on investigation, be 
considered to be due to any professional error.   However distressing the outcome, the 
blame may rest with the perpetrator alone.  A good decision process can lead to a poor 
outcome and a poor decision process can be followed by a good outcome.   
 
The fourth component, the context, is being increasingly recognised in other high risk 
services as the most useful focus for solutions  (Department of Health, 2000; Institute 
of Medicine, 1999).  Reason contends that:  
 
The situation in which errors occur is at least as important as its psychological 
antecedents (if not more so) in triggering its occurrence and shaping its form.  
We cannot easily change human cognition, but we can create contexts in 
which errors are less likely and, when they do occur, increase their likelihood 
of detection and correction … situations can be more or less error-provoking 
(Reason, 2009 p.32). 
 
Reason  (1997) distinguishes between ‘active’ errors and ‘latent’ conditions.  The 
former are the actions or omissions of individuals at the front line that contributed to 
the adverse outcome.  The latter are the underlying features of the organisational 
context, the policy priorities, resources, training and supervision, tools provided, etc.  
These create conditions in which error is more or less likely.   
 
For example, a child protection agency that adopts a policy priority of meeting 
performance indicators sends out a message that other aspects of the work are less 
important.  If supervisors are short of time, there is a high likelihood that supervision 
will focus on whether the worker has met the indicators, reducing time spent on 
critical review of their reasoning.  This creates the scenario where errors of reasoning 
are less likely to be picked up and corrected. We know from research that individuals 
have great difficulty in challenging their own reasoning (hence the need for 
supervision) (Woods & Hollnagel, 2006) and so the error is likely to persist with 
higher probability of an adverse outcome for the child.   
 
Systemic investigations seek to find solutions that alter the latent conditions so that 
the worker operates in a better designed context: 
 
The aim is to make it harder for people to do something wrong and easier for 
them to do it right (Institute of Medicine, 1999 p.2). 
 
Work has been done on adapting the systems approach to case reviews in child 
protection (Fish, Munro, & Bairstow, 2008) but the dominant form of inquiries has 
been person-centred.  The first three categories of error analysis - intention, action, 
and outcome - have been the main focus on inquiry so that error tends to be explained 
by reference to factors within the individual. Underlying this approach is an 
assumption that the individual professional ‘could have’ acted differently; a high 
degree of autonomy is assumed.  As Reason (2009 p.74) points out, this fits with 
Western culture where we place great value in the belief that we are free agents, the 
controllers of our own destinies.  He cites in support research that found that ‘when 
people are given accident reports and asked to judge which causal factors were the 
most avoidable, they almost invariably pick out the human actions’. 
 
This view of error results in solutions aimed at controlling the performance of those 
errant individuals.  There are three main mechanisms for this, all apparent in child 
protection systems.  First, there are psychological strategies, using punishments and 
rewards to shape behaviour and encourage people to work at a higher level. Secondly, 
the autonomy of the individual is reduced where possible. This produces solutions 
that primarily take of the form of prescribing in detail how the action should be 
carried out.  In common with other countries, the past decades of inquiries in England 
have produced an ever-expanding set of procedures and guidance which seek to 
disseminate and standardise good practice (HM Government, 2006). Technology is 
also increasingly being used to influence how professionals function.  For instance, 
many countries and states now have prescribed software packages for social workers 
to use in recording which impose a structure on the reasoning of the workers (e.g. 
Structured Decision Making in Queensland, Australia and the Integrated Children’s 
System in England).  Thirdly, organisations put more effort into monitoring the 
workforce to ensure they are complying with all the rules and guidance.   
 
In many ways, all of these strategies make sense.  Ensuring that people adopt the right 
priorities in their work is very sensible.  Equally, protocols, guidance, and technology 
can help to spread the lessons learned around the organisation and minimise the risk 
of people unknowingly repeating mistakes.  Some degree of monitoring practitioners 
is a standard part of any organisation.  
 
However, problems arise when efforts to control workers lead to a level of 
standardisation that goes beyond the established wisdom and so may not have 
demonstrable links to improved outcomes for children.  Two other developments in 
child protection have encouraged the drive to excessive standardisation and control: 
the impact of a blame culture and the design of the performance management system.   
These have led to an over-valuation of the standardised, measurable aspects of 
practice and a consequent under-valuation of professional expertise and judgment. 
This has a serious impact on the potential for learning from experience because it 
creates a bias towards single- not double-loop learning.  
The impact of blame 
One of the worst consequences of a person-centred approach to explaining error is 
that it reinforces the drive towards a blame culture, a drive already fuelled by 
society’s increasing concern about avoiding risk (Beck, 1992; M Power, 2007).   
 No longer do we see accidents as meaningless, uncontrollable events.  On the 
contrary: accidents are evidence that a particular risk was not managed well 
enough. And behind the mismanagement, there was a person, or multiple 
people. … we expect experts to make accidents comprehensible.  We want 
them to explain which risk factors were not controlled, where, when, and by 
whom.  Accidents are no longer accidents at all. They are failures of risk 
management  (Dekker, 2007 p.x). 
 
There are many psychological and organisational factors that contribute to creating a 
blame culture. 
 
Firstly, it offers a satisfying explanation. Those practitioners closest to the tragic 
outcome are readily identifiable and available to blame.   Blaming someone is 
psychologically satisfying; it distances oneself from any responsibility and feeds the 
belief that errors are avoidable, not just acts of fate.  One bad apple has caused the 
problem and everything will be fine if they are removed. The world, therefore, seems 
less dangerous and less beyond our control.   
 
Secondly, hindsight bias distorts our judgment.  Once we know the outcome, we have 
a tendency to over-estimate what could have been anticipated with foresight 
(Fischhoff, 1975).  The significance of new information, such as an observed change, 
looks so clear to those who know how significant it turned out to be that they grossly 
over-estimate how easy it was to see it at the time when it was hidden in a mass of 
other information.   
 To the retrospective observer all the lines of causality home in on the bad 
event; but those on the spot, possessed only of foresight, do not see this 
convergence (Reason, 2009 p.75). 
 
Thirdly, judgment is biased by the fundamental attribution error.  We tend to explain 
other people’s behaviour differently from our own (Plous, 1993 p.174).  When 
analysing our own actions, we are very aware of the context, of the factors that led us 
to frame the situation in a particular way that then led to the choice of action.  
Explanations therefore tend to focus on those contextual factors. When explaining 
other people, however, we are most aware of the behaviour itself and so focus our 
explanations on that rather than the context. Consequently, we tend to explain their 
actions in terms of their own characteristics.  
 
When we see or hear of someone making an error, we attribute this to the 
person’s character or ability – to his or her personal qualities.  We say that he 
or she was careless, silly, incompetent, reckless or thoughtless.  But if you 
were to ask the person in question why the error happened, they would almost 
certainly tell you how the local circumstances forced them to act in that way.  
The truth of course lies somewhere in between (Reason & Hobbs, 2003 p.15).   
 
Fourthly, organisational factors encourage blaming.  To politicians and senior 
management, person-centred explanations have the obvious attraction of distancing 
themselves from the adverse outcome.  It is also a simple route to take. It is usually 
easy to identify the people close to the tragedy who made mistakes and target them 
for improvement whereas a study of the wider organisational context would take 
considerably more effort.    Individual responsibility also fits readily into the legal 
system where it is easier to ascribe individual than corporate responsibility. 
 
The cumulative effect of blame is to create what Reason (2009 p.73) terms the 
‘vulnerable system syndrome’.  This is characterised by three pathological entities: 
‘blame, denial, and the single-minded and blinkered pursuit of the wrong kind of 
excellence – the latter usually takes the form of seeking to achieve specific 
performance targets’.  A vulnerable system is particularly prone to focusing only on 
single-loop learning – on monitoring and enforcing compliance with existing 
prescriptions – while double-loop learning is severely hampered by individuals’ 
reluctance to report problems for fear of being criticised.   
The impact of New Public Management 
The potential for pursuing the ‘wrong kind of excellence’ is increased by the changes 
in how child protection services are managed.  Since the 1980s, public sector 
management has been transformed by the introduction of techniques from the private 
sector aimed at making the services more efficient and effective, generally referred to 
as New Public Management (NPM).  Two major features of this change are increased 
managerial control of professional behaviour and a greater demand for transparency  
so that services show they are spending public money wisely.  The resulting 
performance management system has created a detailed framework of practice, 
specifying targets and performance indicators to measure and shape practice plus, to 
meet the need for transparency, a paper (or electronic) trail documenting professional 
activity.   
 
These strategies can be seen as improving the feedback loops in the system, of giving 
senior management a more detailed picture of how the organisation is operating.  
They therefore have the potential for improving organisational learning. However, the 
difficulties lie in specifying what information gets fed back and what gets missed.   
For social work, this has been problematic and led to feedback being based on a very 
biased set of data that omits some of the key quality aspects of a relationship-based 
service.   
 
Adapting to the NPM culture has required a transformation of practice, reducing the 
privacy and autonomy with which social workers had operated (Munro, 2004).  The 
audit system requires some way of describing practice and of specifying ‘good’ 
practice.  As social workers had previously operated in a predominantly 
individualistic and humanist manner with a limited explicit knowledge base, this has 
been a major project. It has been complicated by the limited evidence on what leads to 
good outcomes for children.  We cannot confidently give a detailed specification of 
what good practice looks like in each case (Chaffin & Freidrich, 2004).  The 
performance management system that has been devised has a model of good practice 
that is based on expert opinion, not empirically validated.  It therefore should be 
proposed with some caution and a recognition of the need to test its adequacy. 
However, there is little explicit acknowledgement of the extent of uncertainty in the 
knowledge base and this poses a risk of overconfidence that discourages learning.   
 
The most visible aspects of the performance management system are targets, 
performance indicators, and procedures detailing how tasks should be carried out.  
Current systems tend to opt for the more easily measured and so have a focus on 
quantity in preference to quality, with an emphasis on fixed timetables and service 
inputs more than user outcomes (Tilbury, 2004).   
 
The system of targets which is widely used in the public sector has been subject to 
numerous criticisms of leading to skewed priorities and failing to capture key 
dimensions of effectiveness (Bevan & Hood, 2006; M. Power, 2004).  In England, its 
adequacy was challenged in the case of Baby Peter where the relevant London 
Borough was praised and awarded three stars in an inspection conducted after his 
death.  The subsequent submissions to Lord Laming’s progress report on safeguarding 
children contain many examples of how the management system is seen by 
practitioners as damaging their effectiveness (British Association of Social Workers, 
2008; UNISON, 2008).   
The cumulative impact 
Person-centred explanations of error, a blame culture, and the current performance 
management system interact in counterproductive ways to produces systems that are 
defensive and discourage creativity and learning. 
 
Power’s (2007 p.5) analysis of the influence of risk on management practices offers 
some explanation of why the audit system has understated the degree of uncertainty.  
Drawing on Luhmann’s (1992) work, Power argues that introducing the language of 
risk into discourses previously characterised by danger and uncertainty ‘implies a 
domain for decision making about the future and a corresponding allocation of 
responsibility for that decision’ (p.5). It suggests a social expectation that dangers can 
be managed and that it is the responsibility of some agency or person to manage them.  
In child protection, the public have clearly stated just such an expectation.   It is 
professionals’ job to manage the risk to children effectively.   
 
Unfortunately, in practice ‘managing risk effectively’ is often judged by the outcome 
not the process.  In the abstract, everyone acknowledges that, however good a child 
protection service, it cannot eliminate harm to children. In practice, however, the first 
reaction of the public to the death of a child is generally to take it as prima facie 
evidence of ineffective risk management. Organisations have to prove, rather than 
defend, their innocence in the debate about whether any identified errors were 
avoidable, warranting censure, or unavoidable due to the uncertain conditions in 
which judgments and decisions are made.   
 
In this emotionally charged atmosphere, Rothstein et al.’s (2006)  distinction between 
societal risk (the risk to children of maltreatment) and institutional risk (the risk to 
professionals and agencies of being criticised) helps to illuminate organisational 
responses.  The cost of the latter has been increased by the intensity of public reaction 
to mistakes and the closer scrutiny of the inspection processes.  Ideally, the steps that 
professionals take to avoid criticism for poor practice should lead to a higher standard 
of practice and hence to reducing risk to children; managing the two forms of risk can 
be complementary.  In relation to some of the more developed technologies in other 
high-risk areas of work, this is less problematic because there is a larger set of well-
evidenced actions.  In child protection, with its limited knowledge base, 
discriminating between avoidable and unavoidable errors is problematic.  When 
examining any case with a tragic outcome, it is often possible, with hindsight, to see 
that information was available that we now know was evidence of heightened risk.  ‘If 
only the social worker had done X then the child would be alright’ is all too easy a 
conclusion to reach.  When the analysis of error causation gives little attention to the 
context in which it occurred, it reinforces the tendency to consider the error was 
avoidable and to blame the individual. 
 
Faced with an unrealistic expectation of safety, one option for organisations is to 
engage in ‘blame prevention engineering’ (Hood, Rothstein, & Baldwin, 2001), trying 
to transfer or dissipate blame by means other than reducing harm to children, i.e. 
seeking to reduce institutional risk without reducing societal risk.  Their research has 
found that one strategy is ‘protocolization’, introducing more and more detailed 
formal procedures setting out the ‘correct’ way to deal with a case in steps that can be 
readily performed and measured.  This move necessitates going beyond the evidence 
base in specifying what should be done and limiting that specification to tasks that can 
be readily observed and recorded – to provide the clear evidence trail that will deflect 
blame.  Thus, in child protection, formal procedures set out the timescale within 
which an initial assessment must be completed, when a case conference should be 
held and so on but say little about the more challenging aspects of the work such as 
how to assess a family where the father is violent, the mother withdrawn, and the 
child terrified.   
 
This managerial strategy provides the defence of ‘due diligence’ if a tragic outcome 
occurs.  Senior management can demonstrate how their staff followed all the correct 
procedures in working with the case and therefore cannot be blamed.  With the 
notable exception of the recent death of Baby Peter, this defence appears to be 
operating in England where inquiries into child deaths often focus on checking 
whether procedures were followed, rather than judging whether competent 
professional assessments and decisions were made.  Rose and Barnes, in their review 
of serious case reviews, note the priority given to procedures as the mechanism for 
improving practice: 
 
What was marked was the emphasis in the recommendations on reviewing or 
strengthening existing procedures or developing new procedures. This was 
supported by the views of some of the respondents that the systems were 
adequate but the problem was one of staff compliance. There was less 
emphasis than might have been expected on issues of management, 
supervision, staffing resources and staff knowledge, skills and experience. The 
organisational context, which in some agencies at the time was undergoing 
major change, resulting in disruption and discontinuity in staffing, also rarely 
featured in issues to be addressed (Rose & Barnes, 2008 p.88). 
 
For practitioners, this ‘protocolization’ can be frustrating or reassuring, frustrating 
because it constrains their range of action,  reassuring because it limits their personal 
responsibility for their actions.  The more punitive the work culture and risk-averse 
the worker, the more practitioners will opt for the safer route of following procedures, 
however inappropriate they seem in a particular case.   
 
‘Protocolization’ carries dangers. Procedures, however detailed, are always 
incomplete specifications to some degree: 
 
There is always a distance between a written rule and an actual task. This 
distance needs to be bridged; the gap must be closed, and the only thing that 
can close it is human interpretation and application (Dekker, 2006 p.134).  
 
In child protection work, procedures tend to refer to visible tasks but, to carry them 
out, the worker needs to exercise expertise.  For example, conducting an initial 
assessment requires interviewing skills, in order to elicit relevant information, and 
reasoning skills to analyse and reach conclusions on the basis of that incomplete and 
often ambiguous information.  An organisation that prioritises procedures runs the 
risk of undervaluing the professional skills needed to apply the procedures 
competently.  In child protection work, evidence of this risk is seen in the reduced 
time workers have to spend with children and families (Peckover & Hall, 2008) and 
the erosion of supervision of casework, with priority being given to supervising 
managerial tasks (UNISON, 2008) . 
 
Rasmussen’s (1986) work on rule-based (RB) and knowledge-based (KB) actions 
offers a framework for considering how much child protection work can be rule-
based. Rules prescribe what the worker is to do in a given situation; the worker has to 
use judgment to decide what kind of situation it is and then apply the appropriate rule.  
KB behaviour is needed, however, in complex situations where it is not clear what 
needs to be done and the worker has to draw on their expertise and make judgments 
about the best course of action.   If it is known what needs to be done in specific 
situations (e.g. if applying for a care order then complete the Public Law Outline) then 
it is desirable to have a rule.  If, however, the desirable action is not so specific, then 
professional judgment will be more appropriate.  What happens in a defensive culture 
is a tendency to convert as many actions as possible into rule-based not judgment-
based.  Hence, the finding in Rose and Barnes’ review of serious case reviews of the 
tendency to create more rules despite these not addressing the identified weaknesses 
in practice. It is also evidenced in Lord Laming’s (2009) progress report where 
recommendation 19 is that social care agencies stop judging whether a referral from 
other professionals merits an initial assessment, and create a rule that all referrals 
receive one.  Such a rule will have repercussions for both staff and service users.  For 
families, many more will be subjected to an unpleasant inquiry that offers them 
nothing positive.  For staff, it will increase their caseloads and so create new problems 
of deciding what to omit in order to create time for the additional duty. 
 
Despite the lack of empirical backing for such an expansion of rules, its great 
attraction is that, when following a rule leads to an adverse outcome, the worker can 
offer the defence ‘I was doing what I was told to do’ and an agency can plead due 
diligence.  In contrast, when following a judgment leads to an adverse outcome, the 
individual is clearly identifiable and available to blame for making a poor judgment.  
However, one necessary step in creating the space for professionals to be able to 
exercise expert judgment and be creative and flexible in responding to children’s 
needs is to work on clarifying which aspects of practice are appropriately dealt with 
by rules and which require judgment. 
Conclusion 
This article has argued for taking a systems approach to learning how better to 
manage risks to children.  Conceptualising child protection services as complex, 
adaptive systems challenges the view that the ‘top-down, command and control,’ style 
of management is feasible.  Interactions between the subsystems are too complex to 
permit accurate prediction.  Instead organisations need good feedback loops so that 
senior management can learn of problems and facilitate adaptations to avoid them.  
Moving to such an open, reporting culture, however, is very difficult in the current 
social and political context.   The currently dominant way of managing risk and error 
in child protection has produced a set of solutions that has cumulatively encouraged 
increasing standardisation and control, reducing the scope for professional judgment 
and flexibility in responding to children.   
 
Error investigations have focused on the individual elements of errors with 
insufficient attention to the context in which they occurred.  This person-centred 
approach has a great deal of intuitive appeal.  However, it has two major weaknesses. 
First, it has been tried for decades and led to increasing efforts to control workers’ 
performance that have resulted in a system that is not only failing to protect children 
sufficiently but also creating work conditions that are counterproductive, leading to 
distorted priorities and growing alienation of the workforce.  Secondly, the focus on 
control and standardisation is hostile to learning about the weaknesses in practice and 
hence to finding ways of reducing the risks to children.   
 
The current design of management information systems produces feedback on a 
limited range of data and omits areas of work, such as the quality of relationships,  
that are at the heart of good practice.  Moreover, because of its top-down design, it 
tends to look for compliance with prescribed behaviour and be critical of variations 
thus encouraging single- not double-loop learning.   
 
The defensive, controlling style of management is an understandable reaction to the 
level of blame from society when children die.  However, it is a response that 
inadvertently encourages people to place the protection of themselves and their 
agencies above the protection of children. Courage is needed to step out of this and 
that courage is needed first and foremost in senior managers: 
 
Change has to start at the top because otherwise defensive senior managers are 
likely to disown any transformation in reasoning patterns coming from below  
If professionals or middle managers begin to change the way they reason and 
act, such changes are likely to appear strange – if not actually dangerous – to 
those at the top p(Argyris, 1991 p.108). 
 
In child protection, we have limited knowledge about how best to protect children.  
We need to learn and, so, need organisations that encourage learning.  Accepting this 
will be more constructive for children in the long run than over-estimating our 
knowledge and believing that we just need a bit more control of front line workers to 
make the system work properly.   
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